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figure of the Virgin. Probably the creating master himself would never have succeeded in copying it. Some oil paintings representing only the whole figure of the Virgin have proved the worst. I know some painters who have succeeded in making of this sublime figure only something impudent and vulgar."

## LEIBNITZ'S THEODICY.

### *Abridgment of the Controversy Reduced to Formal Arguments.*

Translated from the French of G. W. LEIBNITZ, by A. E. KROGER.

[In connection with the following article of Leibnitz, it may be serviceable to the reader to restate the various points made by Leibnitz in the articles heretofore published from his writings. They are as follows:

1. That the mechanical view of nature, or that view which looks upon all things as merely things in space, or as extended matter, is not sufficient to explain anything; and that, hence, the conception of a metaphysical something else, which is not extended, and which we may call force, must be added to that view.

2. That the insufficiency of explaining by the purely mechanical view arises from this, that every atom is again infinitely divisible, and hence offers no true unities from which alone multiplicity can be explained. Hence along with extended—infininitely divisible—matter we must assume unextended—indivisible—formal atoms, or forces, or entelechies, or souls, or monads, each one whereof is free; and thus, accompanied by or embodied in extended matter, gives to it, the passive, activity: sensation and desire.

3. That, however, we must not account for the phenomena of matter (of the non-Ego) from the conception of the monad (the Ego), but must view material nature altogether empirically, and from the conception of the Ego must derive merely general principles—meaning the universal categories and contemplations under which the empirically perceived phenomena of nature are then to be classified.

4. That the conceptions of beginning and end, birth and death, cannot be applied to the monads or souls, nay, not even to their organic machinery or bodies, since those conceptions furnish no explanation, but postulate miracles; that hence these souls and bodies are perennial and immortal, and that this permanency cannot be a metempsychosis or translation, but only a transformation or augmentation.

5. That the way in which the souls or monads operate upon their material bodies, and thus upon each other, cannot be explained by the category of cause and effect—since that category applies only to the material world—and can be solved only by positing it as an *absolute* mode of operation, or as a pre-established harmony.

6. That, amongst all the monads or souls, there is one class of a superior or moral order, for whose sake "everything else is made," their absolute (moral) activity having indeed an immediate causality over the whole world of nature,

the very changes of that world being so regulated as "to correspond with the felicity of the good and the punishment of the bad."

7. That it is this pre-established harmony between souls and bodies, and the moral and the physical universe, which, or the source of which, we call God.—*Tr.*]

Several intelligent persons have expressed a wish that I should make this supplement to my *Theodicy*, and I have been all the more inclined to follow their advice, as I thus get occasion to remove some other difficulties and to make some remarks on subjects that have not been sufficiently elaborated in that work.

#### OBJECTION FIRST.

*Major*—Whoever does not choose the best, lacks either power, or knowledge, or goodness.

*Minor*—God did not choose the best in creating this world.

*Conclusion*—Hence God lacks either power, or knowledge, or goodness.

#### ANSWER.

I deny the minor of this syllogism; and my adversary proves it by the following prosyllogism: "Whoever creates things with evil that could have been created without evil, or that need not have been created at all, does not make the best choice. But God has created a world wherein there is evil, and which might have been created without evil, or not created at all. Hence God has not made the best choice." To this prosyllogism I reply as follows: I concede the minor of it, for we must acknowledge that there is evil in the world which God has made, and that it would have been possible to create a world without evil, or not to create a world at all, since its creation depends upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, and I might content myself with asking for its proof; but, in order to clear the matter up better, I have concluded to support my denial of it by remarking, that the best way is not always that which tends to avoid the evil, since the evil might be accompanied by a greater deal of good. For instance: the general of an army will love a great victory with a slight wound more than no wound at all and no victory. I have established this more clearly in my work by showing, even in instances taken from mathematics and other sciences, that an imperfection in a part may be required for the greater perfection of the whole. In this I

have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, who has said a hundred times that God has permitted the existence of evil in order to draw from it a good—that is to say, a greater good—and the opinion of Thomas d' Aquinas, that the permission of evil tends to the good of the universe. I have also shown that the ancients called the fall of Adam *felix culpa* (a happy fall), since it was repaired by an immense advantage, the incarnation of the Son of God, which has given to the universe something more noble than all there would otherwise have been amongst the creatures without it. And for the sake of still greater light I have added, that, according to various good authors, it belonged to order and the general welfare that God should leave to certain creatures opportunity to exercise their freedom, even when He might foresee that they might turn it to evil—which He, however, could so easily redress—since it would not be proper that, in order to prevent sin, God should always act in an extraordinary manner. To overcome the above objection it is, therefore, sufficient to show that a world with evil may be better than a world without evil; but in my *Theodicy* I have gone still further, and shown that such a universe must be effectively better than any other possible universe.

#### OBJECTION SECOND.

*Major*—If there is more of evil than of good in intelligent beings, then there is more of evil than of good in God's whole creation.

*Minor*—But there is more of evil than of good in intelligent beings.

*Conclusion*—Hence there is more of evil than of good in God's whole creation.

#### ANSWER.

I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for the major, I do not concede it, because this pretended conclusion from a part as to the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, presupposes tacitly and without proof that the creatures which are destitute of reason cannot enter into comparison and be placed on the same line with those which have reason. But why might it not be that the surplus of good amongst the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world recompenses and outweighs,

perhaps incomparably, the surplus of evil amongst the rational creatures? It is true that the value of the latter is greater, but, on the other hand, the former are much more numerous in comparison; and it is quite possible that the proportion of number and of quantity surpasses that of value and of quality.

As for the minor I deny it no less; that is, I deny that there is more evil than good amongst rational beings. I do not even need to concede that there is more evil than good in the human race, since it may be—and it is quite reasonable—that the glory and perfection of the Blessed is incomparably greater than the misery and imperfection of the Damned, and that thus the excellence of the total good in the smaller number surpasses the misery of the total evil in the greater number. The Blessed approach the Deity, by means of the Divine Mediator, as much as any of His creatures can do, and make a progress in this good which it is impossible that the Damned can make in evil, however close they approximate to the character of demons. *God is infinite, but the demon is limited; the Good can extend infinitely, but the evil has its limits.* It is possible, therefore, and to be believed, that in comparing the Blessed and the Damned the very reverse may happen of what we have said might chance in comparing the rational and the non-rational creatures; that is, it might chance, in comparing the happy and the unhappy, that the proportion of the degrees surpasses that of the number; and that in the comparison of the intelligent and the non-intelligent creatures the proportion of numbers surpasses that of the value.\* I am justified in supposing that a thing might be, so long as it has not been proved to be impossible; however, what I have advanced here is more than a supposition.

But, in the second place, even if I should consider that there is more of evil than of good in the human race, I still have every reason to not concede that there is more of evil

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\* No attentive reader can fail to notice here the intimate relation between the philosophical and the mathematical theories of Leibnitz; and how the former necessarily arose—as Leibnitz himself frequently states—from the latter. The discovery of the Differential Calculus was the discovery of the Monadology.—*Note by Translator.*

than of good in all intelligent creatures. For there is an inconceivable number of *genii*, perhaps even of other rational creatures; and no adversary can prove to me that in the whole City of God, composed of so many spirits, as well as of numberless rational animals and an infinity of species, the evil overbalances the good. Moreover—although it is not necessary to answer an objection in order to prove that something is, when the simple possibility of its being suffices to overthrow that objection—I have taken pains to prove in this work, that the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universe involves that the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all possible kingdoms or governments, and that hence the little evil there is in it must be requisite for the overwhelming immensity of good it contains.

#### OBJECTION THIRD.

*Major*—If it is impossible always to avoid sinning, it is unjust always to punish.

*Minor*—But it is impossible always to avoid sinning, or, in other words, sinning is necessary.

*Conclusion*—Hence it is unjust always to punish.

The minor is proved by this prosyllogism:

*Major*—Everything that is predetermined is necessary.

*Minor*—Every event (hence also sinning) is necessary.

*Conclusion*—Every event (hence also sinning) is predetermined.

The minor of this prosyllogism is again proved thus:

*Major*—Everything that is of the future, that is foreseen, that which is contained in causes, is predetermined.

*Minor*—Every event is of that character.

*Conclusion*—Every event is predetermined.

#### ANSWER.

I concede in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, which is the minor of the first, namely, that every event is predetermined; but I deny the major of the first prosyllogism, which states that “everything that is predetermined is necessary”; understanding by the *necessity* to sin, for instance, or the impossibility not to sin, or to refrain from all action, that necessity whereof we speak here, namely, a necessity which is essential and absolute,

destroying the morality of an act and the justice of its punishment. For should anyone interpret it to mean any other kind of necessity or impossibility, that is, simply a moral or hypothetical necessity—which I shall explain directly—it is evident that I would deny also the major of the objection.

I might have contented myself with this answer and with a demand for the proof of that which I have denied; but I have desired to give also a reason for my opinion as expressed in this *Theodicy*—so as to throw more light on the matter—by explaining the necessity, which must be rejected, and the determination, which must be conceded to occur. This reason is as follows: that necessity, which is contrary to morality and must be denied, and which would make punishment unjust, is an unsurmountable necessity, a necessity which would render all opposition useless though we should try with all our heart to avoid such a necessary action and should make all possible efforts to avoid it. Now it is clear that this necessity is not applicable to voluntary action, since our actions would not be voluntary unless we chose to act. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not absolute, but presupposes a free will; if it is sure that we will do them, it is no less sure that we choose to do them. These voluntary actions and their consequences cannot occur whatever we do or will, unless we do and choose to do that which leads to them. This, indeed, is involved in their prevision and predetermination and constitutes their ground. Now this necessity of free action is called hypothetical condition or necessity, since it presupposes free will and all other requisites; whereas the necessity which cancels morality, and makes punishment unjust as well as rewards useless, is a necessity of things which will make them occur no matter what we do or wish to do. In one word, it is an essential necessity, or what we term an absolute necessity. Thus it serves nothing to plead extenuations or commandments in regard to that which is absolutely necessary; penalties or rewards, praise or blame, will be of no avail; whereas in voluntary actions and their results, precepts, endowed with the power to punish or reward, are often of service, and belong to the order of causes which bring the action into existence. It is for this reason that not only endeavors and efforts

but even prayers are of use, since God took these prayers into consideration before he ordered things, and paid that attention to them which was needful; and that the precept which says *ora et labora*—pray and work—holds good altogether. Hence not only those who pretend—under the vain pretext of a necessity of events—that we may neglect the cares which events demand, but even those who argue against prayers, fall into what the ancients called the Sophisms of Laziness; and the predeterminations of events, instead of destroying morality, rather contribute to it, the causes inclining the free-will without necessitating it. Thus it happens that the determination under discussion is not a necessitating. It is certain—to Him who knows all—that the effect will follow this inclination of the free-will, but the effect will not so follow by a necessary consequence, that is, by a consequence the contrary whereof would imply contradiction; and it is always by such an internal inclination that the free-will determines itself without there being any necessity in the matter. Supposing some one to have the greatest suffering in the world—say, a great thirst—and you will concede that the soul can find some reason to resist it, if it were only to show its power. Thus, although we are never in a state of perfect indifference or equilibrium, and have always a prevailing inclination for that action which we determine to do, this inclination never renders the resolution we determine upon absolutely necessary.

#### OBJECTION FOURTH.

*Major*—Whoever can prevent the sin of another and does not do so, but rather contributes to it though well cognizant of it, is an accomplice of such sin.

*Minor*—God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures, but does not do so, and rather contributes to it by permitting it and by the occasions which he causes to arise, although he is well cognizant of it.

*Conclusion*—Hence God is, &c.

#### ANSWER.

I deny the major of this syllogism. For it might be that one could prevent a sin, but ought not to prevent it, because one could not do it without committing a sin one's self, or—when God is in question—without doing an unreasonable



action. I have set forth in my work instances and have applied them even to God himself. It might likewise happen that one abetted evil, and even sometimes opened the door to it, in doing things which one ought to do. But in doing things which one ought to do, or—speaking of God—doing that which, rightly considered, reason demands, one is not responsible for the results, even though one should foresee them. One does not desire these evil results, but simply lets them pass for the sake of a greater good which one could not reasonably refuse to prefer to other considerations. Hence this is a *consequent* will resulting from an antecedent will, whereby we will the good. I know that some persons, speaking of the antecedent and consequent will of God, have understood the former to mean God's will that all men should be saved; and the latter, that, in consequence of lasting sin, there should be some damned. But these are only illustrations of a more general notion, and we may on the same principle say, that God, by His antecedent will, wills that men should not sin, and by His consequent or final and imperative will—which is always followed by its effect—He wills to give permission to them to sin, the permission being a consequence of superior reasons. Indeed, one might say generally, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the production of good and prevention of evil, each taken in itself and, as it were, detached from the other—*particulariter et secundum quid*\*—according to the measure of the degree of each good or evil occurrence; but that the consequent, or final or total will of God tends to the production of as many good events and things as can be put together, the combination whereof thus becomes determined, and comprehends the permission of such evils and the conclusions of such good as the plan of the best world may require. Arminius in his *Antiperkinsus* has very nicely explained, that the will of God may be termed consequent not only in regard to the action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, but moreover in regard to other anterior divine desires. It is, however, sufficient to consider the above passage from Thomas Aquinas and that of Scotus,† in order to be

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\* Thomas I., qu. 19, r. 6.

† Scotus 1, dist. 46. qu. XI.

convinced that they regard this distinction just as I have presented it here. Still, if any one object to this usage of the terms chosen, let him substitute deliberating will in place of antecedent will, and final or decreeing will in place of consequent will. For I do not wish to dispute about words.

OBJECTION FIFTH.

*Major*—Whoever produces all that which is real in a matter is the cause of that matter.

*Minor*—God produces all that which there is of real in sin.

*Conclusion*—Hence God is the cause of sin.

ANSWER.

I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, since the term *real* has interpretations which might render these premises false; but, in order to explain myself better, I shall make the distinctions. "Real" signifies either simply that which is positive or absolute; or it comprehends, furthermore, that which is particular or limited. In the first case, I deny the major and concede the minor; in the second, I concede the major and deny the minor. I might rest the matter here, but I am quite willing to go further and give the grounds for this distinction. Hence it gives me great pleasure to call attention to this, that all purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection; and that imperfection arises from limitation or particularity; for to limit is to refuse progress and object to any going beyond. Now God is the cause of all perfections, and hence of all realities, when we consider them as purely absolute. But the limitations or privations result from the imperfection of the creatures, whereby their receptivity is limited. It is just as in the case of a loaded boat, which the river causes to move more or less slowly according as it is more or less freighted. Its celerity comes from the river, but the retardation which limits this celerity comes from the cargo. Hence I have shown in my *Theodicy* how the creature, by causing sin, is a defective being; how errors and evil inclinations arise from privation; and how privation is efficient by accident. Hence I have also defended the opinion of St. Augustine,\* who explains, for instance, how God hardens the hearts of the wicked, not by inculcating anything bad

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\* Lib. I. ad Simpl. q. 2.

in the soul, but because the effect of His limited impression is limited by the resistance of the soul and by the circumstances that contribute to this resistance; thus not giving, as it were, to the soul all the good which would be necessary to overcome its evil. He says: *Nec ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.* But if God had wanted to do more He would have had to make either other natures for His creatures, or other miracles to change their natures, which His best plan of a world could not admit of. It is as if the current of a river must be more rapid than its fall permitted; or the boats less loaded, if it were requisite to make these boats float with greater rapidity. Now the original limitation or imperfection of the created beings requires that the best plan of a universe cannot be exempt from certain evils, which, however, turn to great good in that world. These are, so to speak, certain disorders in the parts which marvellously relieve the beauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, when correctly employed, make the harmony more beautiful. But all this is connected with what has already been advanced in answer to the first objection.

## OBJECTION SIXTH.

*Major*—Whoever punishes those that have done as well as it was in their power to do is unjust.

*Minor*—God so punishes.

*Conclusion*—Hence God is unjust.

## ANSWER.

I deny the minor of this argument. I believe that God always extends that aid and grace which suffices those who have a good will, that is, who do not reject His grace by a new sin. Thus I do not acknowledge the damnation of children who have died without baptism, or out of the Church; nor the damnation of adults who have acted according to the light given them by God. Nay, I believe that if anyone follows the light given to him, he will indubitably receive greater light, such as he needs, as the late Mr. Hulseman, a celebrated and profound theologian of Leipzig, has somewhere remarked; and if such a man has stood in want of it during his life-time, he will receive it at least on his death-bed.

## OBJECTION SEVENTH.

*Major*—Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means which produces in them effectively a good will and salutary final faith, has not enough goodness.

*Minor*—God does so.

*Conclusion*—Hence God has not enough goodness.

## ANSWER.

I deny the major. It is true that God might overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart, and He does so sometimes, be it by internal grace or by external circumstances that have a great effect upon the soul; but He does not do so at all times. Whence comes this distinction, some one might ask, and why does His goodness seem limited? It is because, as I have already remarked in my answer to the first objection, it would not be in order to act always extraordinarily and to reverse the connection of things. The reasons for this connection, whereby one man is placed in more favorable circumstances than the other one is, are concealed in the profundity of God's wisdom; they depend upon the universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail to choose, involved it. We judge from the event itself: because God made it, it was impossible to do better. Far from such conduct being contrary to goodness, it is His supreme goodness which led Him to do it. This objection with its solution might have been referred to what has been said on the subject of the first objection, but it seemed advisable to allude to it separately.

## OBJECTION EIGHTH.

*Major*—Whoever cannot do otherwise than choose the best is not free.

*Minor*—God cannot do otherwise than choose the best.

*Conclusion*—Hence God is not free.

## ANSWER.

I deny the major of this argument. On the contrary, it is true and most perfect freedom to be able to use one's free will for the best, and to use it always thus, without being deterred by external forces or internal passions, whereof the one makes us slaves of the body and the other slaves of the soul. There is nothing that is less servile than to be always

led towards the good, and always by one's own inclination and without any displeasure. To say that God must, therefore, have had need of external things is simply a sophism. He created them freely; but having proposed to Himself an end, which is to exercise His goodness, His wisdom determined Him to choose the means most proper to attain this end. To call this a *need* is to take that word in an unusual sense which purges it of all imperfection, somewhat as when we speak of God's wrath.

Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, and ever after obeys, since He obeys the laws He prescribed unto Himself—*semel jussit, semper paret*. But he would have expressed himself better had he said, that God commands always, and is always obeyed; for in willing He always follows the inclination of His own nature; and all the rest of things always follow His will; and this will being always the same, we ought not to say that He obeys only the will He had at first.

Nevertheless, although His will is always immaculate and always tends towards the best, the evil, or the lesser good, which He checks, does not cease to be possible in itself; otherwise the necessity of the good would be a geometrical necessity, so to speak, or a metaphysical necessity, and altogether absolute; the contingency of things would be annihilated and there would be no choice. But the sort of necessity spoken of here, which does not do away with the possibility of the contrary, is called necessity only by analogy, and becomes effective, not by the mere essence of things, but by what is outside of or above them, namely, the will of God. We call this necessity moral necessity, since the sage considers necessity and what *ought* to be equivalent things; and when it is always accompanied by its effect as it is veritably in the perfect sage—that is, God—it may be said that it is a blessed necessity. The nearer created beings approach it, the nearer they approach perfect felicity. Hence this kind of a necessity is not one we try to avoid, or which destroys morality, reward, and praise. For that which it involves happens not whatever we may do or will, but simply because we will it well; and a will, the nature of which it is to choose well, merits, above all, to be

praised; hence it carries its own recompense with it, which is sovereign happiness. And as this constitution of the Divine Nature gives entire satisfaction to him who possesses it, it is the best and most desirable for all creatures that depend upon God. If the will of God had not the principle of the best for its rule, it would tend towards evil, which would be the worst, or it would be in some way indifferent to the good and the evil, and be guided by chance; but a will which allowed itself to be guided by chance would not be worth more for the government of the universe than the fortuitous concurrence of atoms without the existence of any divinity at all.—Nay, even if God' should not abandon Himself to chance in some cases—as He certainly would do if He did not always choose the best, and if he were capable of preferring a less good to a greater good (that is, an evil to a good, since that which prevents a greater good is an evil)—He would still be imperfect as well as the object of His choice. He would not deserve entire confidence. He would act, in such a case, without reason, and the government of the universe would be like some games: balancing between reason and fortune. All this tends to show that this last objection raised against the choice of the best perverts all conceptions of the free and the necessary, and represents even the best to us to be bad: to do which is either malicious or ridiculous.

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## OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF LOGIC.

*Comparison of the English Conservative and Hegelian Methods as developed in Bowen's Logic and Everett's Science of Thought.*

By F. P. STEARNS.

There is no word which we hear more frequently than "logic"; we are told every day by lawyers, politicians, and the newspapers, what is logical and what is not; yet to tell us exactly what logic itself is would puzzle many a skilful manufacturer of arguments. There are not a few indeed who have been applied to lately, men who possess considerable scholarship, and yet were unable to supply the information required. One might have begun to suspect that the power